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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JANICE L. DEBRY ,

:

PLAINTIFF /APPELLANT ,

J
CASE NO.

981420

J

VS.

:
J

DELBERT T. GOATES, M.D.

PRIOTY NO. 15

DEFENDANT/APPELLEE .

JURISDICTION
Utah

Code

Ann.

§78-2a-3(2)(j) provides this Court's

jurisdiction over this appeal transferred to this Court by the
Utah Supreme Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW,
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on
the basis that Debry

failed to establish a doctor-patient

relationship?
The granting of summary judgment presents questions of law,
to be reviewed without deference for correctness.

See e.g.

Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am. , Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah
1991).
This issue was addressed in Ms. Debry's memorandum opposing
summary judgment (e.g. R. 237-238).
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on
the basis that Ms. Debry waived the doctor-patient privilege?

The granting of summary judgment presents questions of law,
to be reviewed without deference for correctness.

See e.g.

Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah
1991).
This issue was addressed in Ms. Debry's memorandum opposing
summary judgment (e.g. R. 239-242).

STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules pertain:
Utah Code Ann. §58-60-102
In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102,
as used in this chapter:
(1) "Client" or "patient" means an individual who
consults or is examined or interviewed by a mental health
therapist acting in his professional capacity.
(2) "Confidential communication" means information,
including information obtained by the mental health
therapist's examination of the client or patient, which is:
(a) (i) transmitted between the client or patient
and a mental health therapist in the course of that
relationship; or
(ii) transmitted among the client or patient, the
mental health therapist, and individuals who are
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the
direction of the mental health therapist, including members
of the client's or patient's family; and
(b) made in confidence, for the diagnosis or
treatment of the client or patient by the mental health
therapist, and by a means not intended to be disclosed to
third persons other than those individuals:
(i) present to further the interest of the client or
patient in the consultation, examination, or interview;
(ii) reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the communications; or
(iii) participating in the diagnosis and treatment of
the client or patient under the direction of the mental
health therapist.
(3) "Hypnosis" means, regarding individuals exempted
from licensure under this chapter, a process by which one
individual induces or assists another individual into a
hypnotic state without the use of drugs or other substances
and for the purpose of increasing motivation or to assist
the individual to alter lifestyles or habits.
(4) "Individual" means a natural person.

(5) "Mental health therapist" means an individual
licensed under this title as a:
(a) physician and surgeon, or osteopathic physician
engaged in the practice of mental health therapy;
(b) registered psychiatric mental health nurse
specialist;
(c) psychologist qualified to engage in the practice
of mental health therapy;
(d) clinical social worker;
(e) certified social worker;
(f) marriage and family therapist; or
(g) professional counselor.
(6) "Mental illness" means a mental or emotional
condition defined in an approved diagnostic and statistical
manual for mental disorders generally recognized in the
professions of mental health therapy listed under
Subsection (5).
(7) "Practice of mental health therapy" means treatment
or prevention of mental illness, including:
(a) conducting a professional evaluation of an
individual's condition of mental health, mental illness, or
emotional disorder consistent with standards generally
recognized in the professions of mental health therapy
listed under Subsection (5);
(b) establishing a diagnosis in accordance with
established written standards generally recognized in the
professions of mental health therapy listed under
Subsection (5);
(c) prescribing a plan for the prevention or
treatment of a condition of mental illness or emotional
disorder; and
(d) engaging in the conduct of professional
intervention, including psychotherapy by the application of
established methods and procedures generally recognized in
the professions of mental health therapy listed under
Subsection (5).
(8) "Unlawful conduct" is as defined in Sections
58-1-501 and 58-60-109.
(9) "Unprofessional conduct" is as defined in Sections
58-1-501 and 58-60-110, and may be further defined by
division rule.
Utah Code Ann. §58-60-113
Evidentiary privilege
regarding admissibility of
in administrative, civil,
accordance with Rule 506 of

for mental health therapists
any confidential communication
or criminal proceedings is in
the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Utah Code Ann. §58-60-114
(1) A mental health therapist under this chapter
may not disclose any confidential communication with a
client or patient without the express consent of:
(a) the client or patient;
(b) the parent or legal guardian of a minor client or
patient; or
(c) the authorized agent of a client or patient.

o

(2) A mental health therapist under this chapter
is not subject to Subsection (1) if:
(a) he is permitted or required by state or federal
law, rule, regulation, or order to report or disclose any
confidential communication, including:
(i) reporting under Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Part 4,
Child Abuse or Neglect Reporting Requirements;
(ii) reporting under Title 62A, Chapter 3, Part 3,
Abuse, Neglect, or Exploitation of Disabled Adult;
(iii) reporting under Title 78, Chapter 14a,
Limitation of Therapist's Duty to Warn;
(iv) reporting of a communicable disease as required
under Section 26-6-6;
(b) the disclosure is part of an administrative,
civil, or criminal proceeding and is made under an
exemption from evidentiary privilege under Rule 506, Utah
Rules of Evidence; or
(c) the disclosure is made under a generally recognized
professional or ethical standard that authorizes or
requires the disclosure.
Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8
There are particular relations in which it is the
policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve
it inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a
witness in the following cases:
(1) (a) Neither a wife nor a husband may either
during the marriage or afterwards be, without the consent
of the other, examined as to any communication made by one
to the other during the marriage.
(b) This exception does not apply:
(i) to a civil action or proceeding by one
spouse against the other;
(ii) to a criminal action or proceeding for
a crime committed by one spouse against the
other;
(iii) to the crime of deserting or
neglecting to support a spouse or
child;
(iv) to any civil or criminal proceeding for
abuse or neglect committed against the child of
either spouse; or
(v) if otherwise specifically provided by
law.
(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his
client, be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him or his advice given regarding the
communication in the course of his professional employment.
An attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk cannot be
examined, without the consent of his employer, concerning
any fact, the knowledge of which has been acquired in his
capacity as an employee.
(3) A clergyman or priest cannot, without the consent
of the person making the confession, be examined as to any
confession made to him in his professional character in the
course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he
belongs.

(4) A physician or surgeon cannot, without the
consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to
any information acquired in attending the patient which was
necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the
patient. However, this privilege shall be deemed to be
waived by the patient in an action in which the patient
places his medical condition at issue as an element or
factor of his claim or defense. Under those circumstances,
a physician or surgeon who has prescribed for or treated
that patient for the medical condition at issue may provide
information, interviews, reports, records, statements,
memoranda, or other data relating to the patient's medical
condition and treatment which are placed at issue.
(5) A public officer cannot be examined as to
communications made to him in official confidence when the
public interests would suffer by the disclosure.
(6) A sexual assault counselor as defined in Section
78-3c-3 cannot, without the consent of the victim, be
examined in a civil or criminal proceeding as to any
confidential communication as defined in Section 78-3c-3
made by the victim.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35
(a) Order for examination. When the mental or
physical condition (including the blood group) of a party
or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of
a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is
pending may order the party or person to submit to a
physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or
certified examiner or to produce for examination the person
in the party's custody or legal control. The order may be
made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to
the person to be examined and to all parties and shall
specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of
the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to
be made.
(b) Report of examining physician.
(1) If requested by a party against whom an order
is made under Rule 35(a) or the person examined, the
party causing the examination to be made shall
deliver to the person examined and/or the other party
a copy of a detailed written report of the examiner
setting out the examiner's findings, including
results of all tests made, diagnosis and conclusions,
together with like reports of all earlier
examinations of the same condition. After delivery
the party causing the examination shall be entitled
upon request to receive from the party against whom
the order is made a like report of any examination,
previously or thereafter made, of the same condition,
unless, in the case of a report of examination of a
person not a party, the party shows that the report
cannot be obtained. The court on motion may order
delivery of a report on such terms as are just, and
if an examiner fails or refuses to make a report the
court may exclude the examiner's testimony if offered
at the trial.

R

(2) By requesting and obtaining a report of the
examination so ordered or by taking the deposition of
the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege
the party may have in that action or any other
involving the same controversy, regarding the
testimony of every other person who has examined or
may thereafter examine the party in respect of the
same mental or physical condition.
(3) This subdivision applies to examinations made
by agreement of the parties, unless the agreement
expressly provides otherwise. This subdivision does
not preclude discovery of a report of any other
examiner or the taking of a deposition of an examiner
in accordance with the provisions of any other rule.
(c) Right of party examined to other medical reports. At
the time of making an order to submit to an examination
under Subdivision (a) of this rule, the court shall, upon
motion of the party to be examined, order the party seeking
such examination to furnish to the party to be examined a
report of any examination previously made or medical
treatment previously given by any examiner employed
directly or indirectly by the party seeking the order for a
physical or mental examination, or at whose instance or
request such medical examination or treatment has
previously been conducted. If the party seeking the
examination refuses to deliver such report, the court on
motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on
such terms as are just; and if an examiner fails or refuses
to make such a report the court may exclude the examiner's
testimony if offered at the trial, or may make such other
order as is authorized under Rule 37.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration
of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after
service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion,
memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in
accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.

(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the
whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what
material facts exist without substantial controversy and
what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying
the facts that appear without substantial controversy,
including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the
trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken
or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is
just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to
the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the
affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in
bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court
shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to
the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which
the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including
reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Utah Rule of Evidence 506
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is examined
or interviewed by a physician or mental health therapist.
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably
believed by the patient to be licensed, to practice
medicine in any state.

(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or
is reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed or
certified in any state as a physicianf psychologist,
clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family
therapist, advanced practice registered nurse designated as
a registered psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, or
professional counselor while that person is engaged in the
diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition,
including alcohol or drug addition.
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is
communicated in confidence and for the purpose of
diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a
privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose
and to prevent any other person from disclosing (1)
diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a
physician or mental health therapist, (2) information
obtained by examination of the patient, and (3) information
transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health
therapist, and persons who are participating in the
diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician
or mental health therapist, including guardians or members
of the patient's family who are present to further the
interest of the patient because they are reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the communications, or
participation in the diagnosis and treatment under the
direction of the physician or mental health therapist.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be
claimed by the patient, or the guardian or conservator of
the patient. The person who was the physician or mental
health therapist at the time of the communication is
presumed to have authority during the life of the patient
to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a
communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental,
or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in
which that condition is an element of any claim or defense,
or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings in which
any party relies upon the condition as an element of the
claim or defense;
(2) Hospitalization
for mental illness. For
communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to
hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the mental
health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment
has determined that the patient is in need of
hospitalization;
(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made
in the course of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a
court-ordered examination of the physical, mental, or
emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or
witness, unless the court in ordering the examination
specifies otherwise.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION

Ms. Debry filed suit against Delbert E. Goates, M.D., in a
complaint alleging medical malpractice as a result of an affidavit
Goates wrote, which was filed by Ms. Debry's former husband in Ms.
Debry's divorce case, Janice L. Debry v. Robert J. Debry, Civil
No. 94401038DA (R. 69-80) (R. 1-3).x
After Goates filed his answer to the complaint (R. 7-9),
Debry obtained leave of the trial court and filed an amended
complaint alleging medical malpractice, slander per se, and
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, stemming from
the issuance of the affidavit (R. 21-27f 49). Goates then filed
an answer to the amended complaint (R. 50-52).
Goates moved for summary judgment (R. 107-223, 226-227),
Debry opposed the motion (R. 230-307), and Goates filed a reply
memorandum in support (R. 331-366).
Judge Wilkinson heard the motion and granted it in an order
dated and filed on June 22, 1998 (R. 544-547).
Debry filed a timely notice of appeal on July 20, 1998 (R.
550).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

During the course of a divorce between Ms. Debry and her
former husband, Robert Debry, which was being heard by Judge Homer
1

The record of the divorce case, which is also on appeal, in case number
960571-CA, has been supplemented to the record in this case. Unless expressly
noted that reference is being made to the divorce case, citations to the
record are to the district court pleadings files in this case.

F. Wilkinson, the defendant in this case, Delbert T. Goates, M.D.,
signed an affidavit on behalf of Mr. Debry, indicating that Ms.
Debry was mentally ill, and recommending that excessive alimony
might exacerbate her conditions. The affidavit stated,
My name is Delbert T. Goates. I give the following
testimony under oath.
1. I am an adult and child psychiatrist.
2. I have had numerous consultations with Jan DeBry
from June 17, 1990 to the present.
3. In addition, I have had consultations with her
current husband, her first husband and all of her children.
4. In my opinion, Mrs. DeBry experiences the traits of
a narcissistic personality. Features of this condition
include
pathological exaggeration, interpersonal
exploitation, and feelings or fantasies of grandiosity.
However, persons with this disorder also demonstrate a
charming and even charismatic exterior.
5. In my opinion, this has been a lifelong condition
which was acquired prior to her late adolescence.
6. I am aware that Mrs. DeBry has been in intensive
psychotherapy regarding her depression
(a common
concomitant condition) for several years with several
therapists. Further evaluation addressing her personality
traits is certainly warranted as an impediment to her
optimal function and the treatment of her depression.[sic]
7. Reasonable alimony will sustain Mrs. DeBry's needs.
There can be a psychological or therapeutic component to
alimony.
Excessive alimony might feed Mrs. DeBry's
grandiose fantasies and exploitive tendencies for enhanced
self-worth and delusions of grandeur.
8. Mrs. DeBry's current therapists might be able to
use these Court proceedings for therapeutic purposes.
Therefore, it is recommended that the Court work with Mrs.
DeBryrs current therapists on the issue of whether, and
when, and how Mrs. DeBry should be confronted with my
affidavit, herein.

(R. 76-78). 2

(Addendum I, Goatesf Affidavit).

Mr. Debry filed the Goates affidavit on May 26, 1994, in
conjunction with his motion for a mental examination of Janice
Debry, which was filed on May 27 f 1994 (R. 122-127 in this case,
R. 26-28, 48-55 in the divorce file).

The memorandum supporting

the motion for a mental examination of Janice Debry provided,
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
(a) Order for examination. When the mental . . . condition
. . . of a party . . . is in controversy, the court in
which the action is pending may order the party or person
to submit to a . . . mental examination by a suitably
licensed or certified examiner. . . . The order may be made
only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the
person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify
the time, place manner, conditions, and scope of the
examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be
made.
In this case, the mental condition of Janice Debry is
at issue for three reasons:
First, plaintiff Janice DeBry is spending $3000-$5000
per month for psychotherapy. Plaintiff will undoubtedly
seek a support award which includes substantial sums for
psychotherapy. Therefore, defendant should be entitled to
a mental examination to determine whether the metal [sic]
illness predated the marriage, and how much continuing
therapy is necessary and appropriate.
Second, this Court will be called upon to determine an
appropriate amount of temporary support and alimony.
2

Mr. Debry attempted to persuade at least one other doctor to diagnose
Ms. Debry with narcissistic personality disorder, and filed a complaint
against the doctor with the Utah Division of Occupational Licensing when the
doctor refused to do so. The Division later dismissed the complaint, finding
it to be without merit (296-299).

However, the Affidavit of Dr. Delbert Goates, filed
herewith, shows that plaintiff suffers from grandiose
delusions. Therefore, plaintiff's demands for support may
be artificially inflated because of plaintiff's alleged
mental illness.
Third, defendant seeks the appointment of a
conservator for plaintiff. Defendant should be entitled to
a mental examination to lay the predicate for the
conservatorship hearing, [at this juncture footnote 2
appears, the text of which is as follows:
There are
several reasons to appoint a conservator; not the least of
which, is that Mrs. DeBry's mental illness will make it
impossible for her to enter into any reasonable settlement
negotiations. If the case is to be settled, it would have
to be through a conservator.]

(R. 122-123).3
On December 20, 1994, Judge Wilkinson denied the motion for
an independent medical examination in the divorce case, with the
proviso that if Ms. Debry claimed expenses for counseling and
therapy, Mr. Debry was entitled to an independent psychiatric
examination (R. 256-257).
3

M r . Debry simultaneously filed an affidavit indicating,
My name is Robert J. Debry. I give the following testimony under oath:
1. I have been advised by competent mental health professionals that my
wife suffers from a sever [sic] narcissistic personality disorder (also known
as a mental illness).
2. I have made extensive inquiry to determine the best facility in the
United States to diagnose and treat this disorder. The Menninger Clinic in
Topeka, Kansas was on top of everyone's list.
3. I asked my wife if she would voluntarily go in for a one week
evaluation. She agreed to go if I would give her extra money to pay some
outstanding bills she had incurred.
4. Based upon her promise, I gave her approximately $18,000 in extra
support payments.
5. Mrs. DeBry spent the money, and then canceled two days prior to the
scheduled evaluation.
6. In the meantime, Mrs. DeBry is spending $3,000-$5,000 per month for
psychotherapy. I question the value and effectiveness of that therapy.

(R. 305-06).

Ms. Debry later filed this suitf alleging that in issuing the
affidavit without Ms. Debry's prior approval and without invoking
Ms. Debry's doctor/patient privilege, Goates violated Ms. Debry's
doctor/patient privilege and committed medical malpractice (R. 14).

In her amended complaintf Ms. Debry added an allegation that

the issuance of the affidavit constituted slander per se, arguing
that the contents of the Goates affidavit were false and intended
to injure Ms. Debry and her reputation (R. 24-25). She also added
an allegation that the issuance of the affidavit constituted
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress (R. 25-26).
In his motion for summary judgment, Goates argued that there
was no doctor-patient relationship between him and Ms. Debry, and
thus he owed and breached no duty to her in issuing the affidavit
(R. 110-111), and that if there was a doctor-patient relationship,
Ms. Debry waived the privilege when Ms. Debry placed her medical
condition at issue in the Debry divorce (R. 112-113).

Goates also

argued that his affidavit did not constitute slander per se (R.
114-115), that he was absolutely privileged by the judicial
privilege

(R. 115-117), that his conduct was insufficiently

outrageous to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of severe
emotional

distress

(R.

117-119),

and

that

Debry

had

not

established proximate cause between her injuries and the Goates
affidavit (R. 119-120).
In reply, Ms. Debry argued that the evidence established that
there was a doctor-patient relationship (R. 237-238), and that Ms.
Debry did not waive the privilege (R. 238-242).

Ms. Debry also

argued that the affidavit did constitute slander per se (R. 243-

244), that Goates was not entitled to claim the judicial privilege
(R. 242-243), that Goates' conduct was sufficiently outrageous to
sustain

a claim

of

intentional

infliction

of

intentional

infliction of severe emotional distress (R. 244-245), and that
Debry had established that the issuance of the Goates affidavit
was the proximate cause of her injuries (R. 245-246).
In the minute entry

granting

summary

judgment, Judge

Wilkinson stated, "The court finds the privilege belongs to the
plaintiff.

The court finds there was not a doctor-patient

relationship.

Defendant's motion

granted." (R. 544).

for summary

judgment is

[Addendum II, Court's Minute Entry].

The

order prepared by counsel for Goates and signed by Judge Wilkinson
states, "Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and
plaintiff's Complaint and each and every cause of action thereof
shall be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits
on

the

basis

that

plaintiff

has

not

established

that

a

physician/patient relationship existed between her and Dr. Goates,
and that even if a physician/patient relationship did exist, that
relationship was waived at the time Dr. Goates submitted his
affidavit in the divorce case." (R. 545-546)

[Addendum III,

Court's Order].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Summary judgment was entered on two basis: there was no
doctor-patient relationship between Goates and Debry, and Debry
waived the doctor-patient privilege prior to Goates' issuance of
the affidavit.

Review of the governing law demonstrates that there was
indeed a doctor-patient relationship between Goates and Debry, and
that Debry did not waive her doctor-patient privilege prior to
Goates' issuance of the affidavit.
To the extent that the facts underlying these two issues were
in dispute, the trial court should have resolved them in Ms.
Debry's favor in ruling on the summary judgment motion.
Because the trial court erred in granting summary judgment,
this Court should reverse the trial court's order granting summary
judgment and remand this case for a trial.

ARGUMENT
I . THERE WAS A DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN GOATES AND DEBRY.

For purposes of c o n f i d e n t i a l communications between a doctor
and p a t i e n t , Utah Rule of Evidence 506(a)(1) 4 defines a p a t i e n t as
"a person who c o n s u l t s
physician

or

mental

or i s

health

examined or

therapist."

interviewed
506(a)(2)

by a

defines

physician as "a person l i c e n s e d , or reasonably believed by t h e
p a t i e n t t o be l i c e n s e d , t o p r a c t i c e medicine in any s t a t e . " And
506(a)(3) defines "mental health t h e r a p i s t " as "a person who i s or
i s reasonably believed by the p a t i e n t t o be licensed or c e r t i f i e d
4

In the t r i a l c o u r t , Goates a t times argued t h a t the question of the
d o c t o r - p a t i e n t p r i v i l e g e was governed by Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8 ( e . g . R.
111). The Advisory committee Note t o Rule 506 i n d i c a t e s t h a t the r u l e " i s
intended t o supersede Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8(4)". See also Utah Code Ann.
§58-60-113 ("Evidentiary p r i v i l e g e for mental h e a l t h t h e r a p i s t s regarding
a d m i s s i b i l i t y of any confidential communication in a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , c i v i l , or
criminal proceedings i s in accordance with Rule 506 of t h e Utah Rules of
Evidence.").

in any state as a physician, psychologist, clinical or certified
social worker, marriage and family therapist, advanced practice
registered nurse designated as a registered person is engaged in
the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition,
including alcohol or drug addiction."

Similarly, Utah Code Ann.

§58-60-102 (l)and (5) define a patient or client as "an individual
who consults or is examined or interviewed by a mental health
therapist acting in his professional capacity[,]" and include
within the definition of mental health therapist physicians
"engaged in the practice of mental health therapy."
While there is a dearth of Utah case law on this particular
point, decisions from other courts demonstrate that the existence
of a doctor-patient relationship turns on a number of factors,
including whether the doctor has performed tests, prescribed
medications, and undertaken medical responsibility
patient.

See e^_g.

for the

Middleton v. Beckett, 960 P.2d 1213, 1216-17

(Colo.App. 1998)(no doctor-patient relationship existed between
psychiatrist

and motorist

he examined, where

psychiatrist

performed no tests, prescribed no medication, and had undertaken
no responsibility for motorist's medical care, and where motorist
placed his condition in issue in medical malpractice action).
The patient's will or opinion certainly does not control the
existence

of

a

doctor-patient

relationship,

for

such

a

relationship may exist without the patient's consciousness or
consent and even over her objection, where a physician attends the
patient for the purposes of providing professional aid.
State v. Pitchford, 697 P.2d 896, 900 (Kan. App. 1985). In

See e.g.

Pitchford, the court rejected the government's argument that the
defendant had no doctor-patient relationship because he did not
consult with or voluntarily

submit to the doctor

for

medical

treatment but was combative and resisted medical treatment when
the police brought him to the hospital.

697 P.2d at 900.

court explained persuasively why the p a t i e n t ' s

The

attitude toward

medical treatment does not control f statingf
The State's literal reading [of the statute governing
privilege], however, would render the physician-patient
privilege inapplicable to many persons needing medical
treatment the most.
Persons brought to a hospital
unconscious, in severe shock, or otherwise unable to
consult or submit to a doctor would not be "patients" under
the State's interpretation.
Neither would persons
involuntarily committed to various mental health
i n s t i t u t i o n s where the sole object is involuntary
treatment.
Such an interpretation is unreasonable and is
not mandated by the statute.
"The rule of privilege may
apply where a physician attends a person for the purpose of
giving professional aid even though the person attended is
unconscious or unaware of his presence, does not consent,
or actually objects to being treated."
97 C.J.S.,
Witnesses §294(e)[.]

Pitchford at 900 (citations omitted).
In ruling that there was no doctor-patient relationship in
the instant matter,

Judge Wilkinson was likely relying on the

deposition of Ms. Debry.5

5

Out of an abundance of caution, Ms. Debry marshals t h e evidence i n
support of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g , and demonstrates herein t h a t t h e t r i a l
court was i n c o r r e c t as a matter of law.

Ms. Debry testified that she was taking Synthroid, Paxil,
Klonopin, and Trazodone at the time of her deposition, and that
this medication might cloud her memory, that it would not
influence her judgment, and that she did not know if it impaired
her ability to answer questions (R. 170, p. 5, R. 171 p.6, R. 178
pp. 34-35).
In her deposition, Ms. Debry testified that Goates was
appointed during her first divorce to assess the proper custodial
placement of her children (R. 179 pp. 38-39).

She indicated that

she and Mr. Debry went to Goates to insure that Ms. Debry would
get custody of her children from the former marriage, and she
maintained that she did not like Goates and never saw Goates for
her own personal needs (R. 179, pp. 40-41, R. 180 pp. 42-43).

She

testified that he never discussed his diagnosis of her supposedly
narcissistic personality disorder with her, and she indicated that
she was never his patient and that he did not diagnose her (R. 192
pp. 52-53).

She testified that she never went to see him alone,

without her children (R. 190 p. 82). She maintained that he was
never her doctor, but was the doctor for her children, who
recommended that she be awarded custody (R. 190 p. 83).

She

testified that she was never his client and he was never her
counselor (R. 192 page 90). She maintained that she did not see
him as a patient regarding her mental state, but did acknowledge
that he did perform psychological testing of her and her first
husband in assessing the custody issue in their divorce (R. 2 01,
page 129).

She testified that he did not give her any other

tests, did not counsel her about a mental disorder, and that she
did not seek this type of advice (R. 202, p. 131).
In contrast, Debry conceded that he prescribed medication for
her

(R. 177, pp. 31-32, R.

179, p. 40), and a notarized

pharmacist's list indicated that Goates had prescribed Desyrel,
Prozac, Valium, and Lopressor to Ms. Debry (R. 294-95).
Under the rationale explained in Pitchford, Judge Wilkinson
should not have rested the summary judgment order on Ms. Debry's
subjective opinion about whether or not there was a doctor-patient
relationship.

This is particularly so, given the evidence

establishing the existence of a doctor-patient relationship.
Goates' affidavit, which

is the

basis

for

the

suit,

essentially represents that Goates was Debry's doctor and that she
was his patient, indicating that she had consulted with him
numerous times, and including his diagnoses (R. 284-286).
During the discovery process, Goates conceded that he was
Debry's

doctor.

In response

to Ms. Debry's

request

for

admissions, he admitted that he had a doctor-patient relationship
with Ms. Debry, that he counseled Ms. Debry, and that he had
written prescriptions for Ms. Debry (R. 287-288).
Goates told Dr. Jack Jenson that he had a doctor-patient
relationship with Debry (R. 297).
The panel opinion from the pre-litigation hearing recognized
that Goates had a doctor-patient relationship with Debry and
violated her privilege when he issued the affidavit (R. 291-93).

i n

In sum, there was ample evidence of a doctor-patient
relationship.

See Utah Rule of Evidence 506; Utah Code Ann. §58-

60-102; Middleton and Pitchford,

supra.

In ruling that there was no doctor-patient privilege, the
trial court failed to observe the foregoing legal standards
defining the doctor-patient relationship.
Judge Wilkinson also failed to recognize that while questions
of privilege

are normally questions of law for Courts to

determine, when the facts underlying the privilege are in dispute,
those facts are to be submitted to the jury.

See Berry v. Moench,

331 P.2d 814, 818 (Utah 1958)(in discussing the common interest
privilege in a case wherein a physician wrote a letter discussing
his patient's psychiatric history, the court indicatedf "If the
facts upon which the privilege would rest are not in dispute,
whether the privilege exists is a question for the court to
determine.

If they are in dispute the jury must determine the

facts and upon them the court determines

the question of

privilege.")(footnote citing to the Restatement of Torts omitted).
Finally, the trial court overlooked the cardinal rules
governing the adjudication of summary judgment motions —

that

summary judgment is to be granted only when there are no material
factual disputes, and that all facts and inferences are to be
drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment — Ms. Debry
in this case.

See e.g. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436

(Utah 1982)(in summary judgment, all facts and inferences are to
be drawn in favor of party opposing summary judgment).

At a minimum, the t r i a l court erred in resolving the f a c t s in
favor

of

material

Goates
facts

and i n

granting

summary judgment where

underlying t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e

r e l a t i o n s h i p were in d i s p u t e .

See Berry and Bowen,

This Court should t h e r e f o r e

the

doctor-patient
supra.

r e v e r s e t h e p o r t i o n of

Judge

W i l k i n s o n ' s r u l i n g g r a n t i n g summary judgment on t h e b a s i s

that

t h e r e was no d o c t o r - p a t i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p .

II. MS. DEBRY DID NOT WAIVE THE DOCTOR-PATIENT PRIVILEGE.
As noted

above, in the minute entry

granting

summary

judgment, Judge Wilkinson stated, "The court finds the privilege
belongs to the plaintiff. The court finds there was not a doctorpatient relationship.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is

granted." (R. 544). The order prepared by counsel for Goates and
signed by Judge Wilkinson states, "Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted and plaintiff's Complaint and each and every
cause of action thereof shall be and is hereby dismissed with
prejudice and on the merits on the basis that plaintiff has not
established that a physician/patient relationship existed between
her and Dr. Goates, and that even if a physician/patient
relationship did exist, that relationship was waived at the time
Dr. Goates submitted his affidavit in the divorce case." (R. 545546).
The divorce case records in Janice L. Debry v. Robert J.
Debrv,

district

court

case

number

944901038,

supplemented to the record for this appeal.6
6

have

been

These records

The divorce case is also being appealed, in case number 960571-CA.

demonstrate that Ms. Debry had not waived the privilege at the
time that the Goates affidavit

was

filed.

Ms. Debry's original divorce complaint did not raise her
mental health as a claim or defense (R. 248-253; R. 1-6 in the
divorce case).
Mr. Debry's counterclaim did attack Ms. Debry's mental
health, indicating,
13. Plaintiff suffers from a severe personality
disorder, which is a mental illness, which mental illness
predates the marriage between the plaintiff and the
defendant. The mental illness remains intractable and
persistent, despite extensive therapy. The mental illness
has rendered the plaintiff incapable of handling funds and
monies. Therefore, a conservator should be appointed for
and on behalf of the plaintiff to manage her financial
affairs and to ensure that any sums of money that are paid
by defendant are properly accounted for.
(R. 15 in divorce case).

This counterclaim was filed on March 29,

1994 (R. 11 in divorce case).
Ms. Debry denied paragraph 13 of the counterclaim in her
reply filed on April 7, 1994 (R. 18-19 in divorce case).
Mr. Debry then filed the Goates affidavit on May 26, 1994 (R.
24-26 in the divorce case), in conjunction with his motion for a
mental examination under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35, which
was filed on May 27, 1994 (R. 48-55 in the divorce case).
Under any conceivable Utah statute or rule, there was no
waiver of privilege by Ms. Debry at the time that the Goates
affidavit was filed, because at the time of the filing of the
affidavit, Ms. Debry had not raised her mental health as an

element or factor in any claim or defense.

See Utah Rule of

Evidence 506(d),7 Utah Code Ann. §58-60-114(1) and (2)(b)f8
Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8(4)/ Rule of Civil Procedure 35.10
Reference to case law confirms that there was no waiver on
the facts of this case.

Compare Styers v. Superior Court In and

That rule provides, in relevant part,
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communication
relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of
the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of
any claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings
in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of the claim
or defense[.]

8

That statute provides, in relevant part,
(1) A mental health therapist under this chapter may not disclose any
confidential communication with a client or patient without the express consent
of:
(a) the client or patient;
(b) the parent or legal guardian of a minor client or patient; or
(c) the authorized agent of a client or patient.
(2) A mental health therapist under this chapter is not subject to
Subsection (1) if:
(b) the disclosure is part of an administrative, civil, or criminal
proceeding and is made under an exemption from evidentiary privilege under Rule
506, Utah Rules of Evidence[. ]

9

That statute provides, in relevant part,
(4) A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient,
be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending the
patient which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient.
However, this privilege shall be deemed to be waived by the patient in an
action in which the patient places his medical condition at issue as an element
or factor of his claim or defense. Under those circumstances, a physician or
surgeon who has prescribed for or treated that patient for the medical
condition at issue may provide information, interviews, reports, records,
statements, memoranda, or other data relating to the patient's medical
condition and treatment which are placed at issue.

10

This rule governed Mr. Debry's original motion for a mental evaluation
of Ms. Debry, and states in relevant part,
(2) By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered or
by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any
privilege the party may have in that action or any other involving the same
controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or
may thereafter examine the party in respect of the same mental or physical
condition.

0*5

For County of Mohave, 779 P.2d 352 (Ariz.App. 1989)(in divorce
proceedings wherein husband sought distribution of debt for his
psychiatric counseling during the marriage, there was no waiver of
privilege concerning premarital psychiatric treatment); with
Clawson v. Walgreen Drug, 162 P.2d 759, 764 (Utah 1945)("a patient
cannot testify concerning what was said and done by his physician
in the treatment of the injuries which are the subject of the
litigation and then close the physician's mouth by claiming
privilege.").n
The trial court's ruling that Ms. Debry waived the doctorpatient privilege was likely based on Ms. Debry's deposition
testimony.12
She testified during the deposition that it was in response
to her effort to get $4,500 a month for medical, dental and
counseling that Mr. Debry filed the Goates' affidavit (R. 181, pp.
48-49).

Counsel for Ms. Debry clarified that the Goates'

affidavit was filed four days prior to any request by Ms. Debry
for support (R. 192 p. 50). Ms. Debry again testified that it was
in response to her request for support that Mr. Debry moved to
have her examined (R. 182, p. 50).13
11

There is not a great deal of Utah case law on the question of waiver of
the privilege. However, the plain language of the statutes and rules is
dispositive.
u

Out of an abundance of caution, Ms. Debry marshals the evidence in
support of the trial court's ruling, and demonstrates herein that the trial
court was incorrect as a matter of law.
13

Ms. Debry testified that she was taking Synthroid, Paxil, Klonopin, and
Trazodone at the time of her deposition, and that this medication might cloud
her memory, that it would not influence her judgment, and that she did not
know if it impaired her ability to answer questions (R. 170, p. 5, R. 171 p.6,
R. 178 pp. 34-35).
Assuming arguendo that Ms. Debry had been correct in her testimony that
the Goates affidavit was filed by Mr. Debry in response to her request for

In contrast, Ms. Debry testified that her mental state became
an issue in the divorce after the Goates affidavit was filed (R.
182, p. 53).
Once again the trial court erred in relying on the Ms.
Debry's opinion on the issue concerning waiver of privilege,
because that issue is governed by the statutes, rules and case law
quoted above, which demonstrate that there was no waiver on the
facts of this case.

See e.g. Utah Rule of Evidence 506(d);

Styers, supra.
Judge Wilkinson also failed to recognize that while questions
of privilege

are normally questions of law for Courts to

determine, when the facts underlying the privilege are in dispute,
those facts are to be submitted to the jury.

See Berry v. Moenchf

331 P.2d 814, 818 (Utah 1958)(in discussing the common interest
privilege in a case wherein a physician wrote a letter discussing
his patient's psychiatric history, the court indicated, "If the
facts upon which the privilege would rest are not in dispute,
whether the privilege exists is a question for the court to
determine.

If they are in dispute the jury must determine the

facts and upon them the court determines

the question of

privilege.")(footnote citing to the Restatement of Torts omitted).
Finally, the trial court overlooked the cardinal rules
governing the adjudication of summary judgment motions —

that

summary judgment is to be granted only when there are no material
factual disputes, and that all facts and inferences are to be
alimony to pay for therapy, such a request would not have constituted a claim
or defense, and thus would not have constituted a waiver of the privilege.
See e.g. Utah Rule of Evidence 506(d); Styers, supra.

drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment — Ms. Debry
in this case.

See e.g. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436

(Utah 1982)(in summary judgment, all facts and inferences are to
be drawn in favor of party opposing summary judgment).
At a minimum, the trial court erred in resolving the facts in
favor of Goates and in granting summary judgment where the
material facts underlying the waiver of the doctor-patient
relationship were in dispute. See Berry and Bowen,

supra.

This Court should therefore reverse the portion of Judge
Wilkinson's ruling granting summary judgment on the basis that Ms.
Debry waived her doctor-patient relationship prior to the issuance
of the Goates affidavit.
CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the trial court's order granting
summary judgment, and remand this matter to the trial court for
trial.
Dated this 5th day of May, 1999.

lapl^Ami de Montreux ^
Counsel for Ms. Debry

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I, Bel-Ami de Montreux, hereby certify that I have caused to
be hand-delivered/mailed,

first-class postage prepaid, eight

copies of the brief, including the original signature copy, to the
Utah Court of Appeals, and two copies of the brief to P. Keith
Nelson and Mark L. McCarty at Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson,
Key Bank Tower, 7th floor, 50 South Main Street, P.O. Box 2465,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 this 5th day of May, 1999.

Bel-Ami de Montreux
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DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 77S
Provo, UT S4603
T«kphoi»: (SOI) 3734345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANICE DEBRY,
Plaintiff,

\
]

AFFIDAVIT OF DELBERT T. GOATES

vs.
ROBERT DEBRY,

I
Defendant.

Case No. 944901038DA

1 Judge John A. Rolrich

My name is Delbert T. Goates. I give the following testimony under oath:
1.

I am an adult and child psychiatrist

2.

I have had approximately twenty consultations with Jan DeBry from June

17f 1990 to the present
3«

In addition, I have had consultations with her current husband, her first

husband and all of her children.
4.

In my opinion, Mrs. DeBry experiences the traits of a narcissistic

personality disorder (as more fiilly defined in DSM-HIR). Features of this condition include

pathological exaggeration, interpersonal exploitation, and feelings or fantasies of grandiosity.
However, persons with this disorder also demonstrate a charming and even charismatic exterior.
5.

In my opinion, this has been a lifelong condition which was acquired prior

to her late adolescence.
6.

I am aware that Mrs. DeBry has been in intensive psychotherapy regarding

her depression (commonly occurring with narcissism) for several years with several therapists.
Further evaluation addressing her personality traits is certainly warranted as an impediment to
her optimal function and the treatment of her depression.
7.

If the Court requires an additional independent evaluation, I would suggest

a conjoint evaluation of the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas. Menninger is probably the
foremost clinic in the United States for persons with this type of problem. The evaluation would
give guidance as to diagnosis, prognosis, and recommended therapy.
8.

Reasonable alimony will sustain Mrs. DeBry's needs. There can be a

psychological or therapeutic component to alimony.

Excessive alimony might feed Mrs.

DeBry's grandiose fantasies and exploitive tendencies for enhanced self-worth and delusions of
grandeur.
9.

Mrs. DeBryfs current therapists might be able to use these Court

proceedings for therapeutic purposes. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court work with
Mrs. DeBry's current therapists on the issue of whether, and when, and how Mrs. DeBry should
be confronted with my affidavit, herein.

2

DATED this 2>S day of March, 1994.

DELBERT T. GOATES, M.D.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this J J g f y y of
XAqjuiM

1994.

NOTAAV PU«UC
TAKYA UUNO
42BSaflt7Q0EMt

NOTARY Ptmuqj

nanomtm

^

RESIDING IN: , Q o i i ^ g U ^ P

My Commission Expires:
s
SflCO-B.OCEAl
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Addendum II

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JANICE L DEBRY,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

Case No: 960906212 MP

DELBERT E MD GOATES,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

HOMER WILKINSON
June 10, 1998

jaredl

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): BEL AMI DEMONTREUX
Defendant's Attorney(s): P. KEITH NELSON
Video

HEARING
COUNT: 7.40
DEFENDANT ARGUES IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
COUNT: 8.06
PLAINTIFF RESPONDS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
COUNT: 8.17
DEFENDANT REPLIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND THE SAME IS SUBMITTED.
COUNT: 8.21
AS READ INTO THE RECORD, THE COURT NOW BEING FULLY BRIEFED AND
ADVISED IN THE PREMISES FINEDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS:
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT / DEPOSITION OF THE
PLAINTIFF IS DENIED.
THE COURT FINDS THE PRIVILEGE BELONGS TO THE PLAINTIFF.
THE COURT FINDS THERE WAS NOT A DOCTOR / PATIENT RELATIONSHIP.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED.
DEFENDANT IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER. THE TRIAL DATE IS STRICKEN.

Addendum III

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

P. KEITH NELSON [A2391]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant, Delbert T. Goates, M.D
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

JUN 2 2 1998

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JANICE L.DEBRY,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff,
vs.
DELBERT T. GOATES, M.D.,
Defendant.

Civil No. 960906212
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant Delbert T. Goates, M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Motion
to Strike Plaintiffs Deposition came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson pursuant to notice on June 10, 1998. Both parties appeared through counsel and
presented oral argument. The Court having heard oral argument, having reviewed the memoranda
filed by both parties, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, and it appearing just and
proper, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is denied;

2.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiffs

Complaint and each and every cause of action thereof shall be and is hereby dismissed with

prejudice and on the merits on the basis that plaintiff has not established that a physician/patient
relationship existed between her and Dr. Goates, and that even if a physician/patient relationship
did exist, that relationship was waived at the time Dr. Goates submitted his affidavit in the divorce
case. Both parties are to bear their own respective costs and attorneys' fees.
DATED this

day of June, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

2

